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A COST-EFFECTIVE LOOK AT SPACECRAFT COMPONENT TESTING
Louis Gomberg
RCA Astro-Electronics Division
Princeton, New Jersey
more effective test for weeding out incipient problems
would consist of several thermal cycles with a dT/dt
of approximately 0. 5°C per minute. It also became
apparent that it would be desirable for test facility,
and schedule reasons that the test be performed with a
temperature box. To ascertain whether this was pos
sible, a systematic review of the merits of vacuum
testing was conducted. This took the form of an analy
sis of the failure history of several RCA programs
(for example, Relay, Lunar Orbiter, RAE, and a clas
sified program). A review of the effects of vacuum on
the materials and parts in the articles and on the arti
cles' actual function was conducted.

Summary
The trend towards fixed price programs accom
panied by stringent schedule requirements, has forced
RCA to make a critical reassessment of the traditional
methods for testing spacecraft and spacecraft com
ponents. The assessment consisted of a detailed review
of the rationale for vacuum testing at the component
level and a concommitant review of the failure history
on several successful spacecraft programs. As a
result, certain conclusions were drawn:
•

Vacuum testing is only required on vacuum
sensitive items;

•

The sensitivity of these items could be
predicted; and

•

Effects of Vacuum Operation
When designing for vacuum operation, considera
tion must be given to:

A thermal cycle test would be more protective.

These conclusions have now been implemented
successfully in a major classified spacecraft program.

•

Temperature — in a vacuum, convection is no
longer present as a heat transfer process.

•

Outgassing — materials with high vapor pres
sure will change state from a solid to a gas.
Additionally, some gas may be absorbed or
trapped in the conformal coating, etc.

•

Sublimation — certain metals and other mate
rials will vaporize in vacuum and deposit on
the nearest cold surface.

•

Breakdown — in vacuum, effects such as
Paschen's law, multipactor, electrical arcing
and other phenomena become a serious con
sideration.

•

Dimensional anomalies — the loss of atmos
pheric pressure can cause dimensional distor
tion in housings, boards and parts.

•

Migration of lubricating materials — certain
lubricants tend to migrate or otherwise dis
appear in vacuum.

•

Cold welding — rotating or sliding metal parts
may stick or cold-we Id in vacuum under certain
conditions.

Introduction
It has been an act of faith in spacecraft testing to
subject all spacecraft components to vacuum thermal
testing prior to their integration on the spacecraft.
With the emphasis on fixed-price contracts and
stringent scheduling, a detailed reassessment was
made of this philosophy. Asa result, it was concluded
that many components did not require vacuum testing.
Additionally, the components which will require vac
uum testing can be predicted in advance. The remain
der of this paper delineates the rationale and analyses
which resulted in this decision.
The purpose of vacuum testing at the component
level is to (1) provide confidence in its ability to per
form in vacuum at the spacecraft test level and ulti
mately in orbit; (2) determine the suitability of the
design for vacuum operation; and ( 3) detect vacuumsensitive anomalies.
For the program under consideration, the specified
component test plan was carefully analyzed. It required
all components to be tested in vacuum for 12 hours at
each of three temperature levels with the temperaturetime rate of change (dT/dt) unspecified. This program
had been in existence for several years at RCA, and
the test philosophy was thoroughly embedded.

It became clear that not performing vacuum testing
might permit deficiencies in the areas cited to go un
detected and prevent verification at the component test
level. To determine whether this was a real possibil
ity, each component was reviewed in terms of its mate
rials, parts, application and history for possible prob
lems. The results are summarized in the following
paragraphs.

An initial review of the failure history showed that
the component tests were not as effective as they should
have been in protecting against system failures. It
appeared that the reason for this deficiency lay in the
limited number of temperature cycles and the specified
dT/dt which permitted gradual temperature transitions.
Based on other program experience, it appeared that a
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Thermal

Breakdown Effects

To compensate for the addition of convection as a
thermal heat transfer process, 5°C was added to the
top end of the temperature. Thus, components sub
jected to thermal cycling underwent temperature level
tests which were 5°C higher than those required in
vacuum. This was considered by the thermal group
to be more than adequate compensation.

The factors which can initiate electrical break
down in vacuum are well known. These are:
• Voltages present in excess of 200 volts.
• Presence of substantial amounts of RF power.
• High voltage gradients (volts/mil) resulting
from sharp edges, etc.

Qutgassing

The spacecraft components were reviewed as
delineated in the attached table. The only components
liable to have problems in this area are transmitters.

All parts and materials were reviewed to provide
assurance that they will not outgas. For example, all
RCA components utilize printed circuit board con
struction, employing 2 -ounce G-li glass epoxy with
electrolytic copper traces coated with reflowed, elec
tro-deposited Sn-Pb (60 to 40 percent). These boards
and the process for their fabrication have been suc
cessfully employed by RCA for the past five years on
such programs as TIROS, Lunar Orbiter, RAE-AAS,
Ranger, etc.

Momentum wheel assemblies, despite their low
voltage application, were tested in vacuum to provide
a reference for motor current and assure adequate
lubrication throughout the system.
Tape Recorders. Since the recorders are hermet
ically sealed, pressurized and helium -leak tested after
each environmental exposure, it was decided that it
would be safe to forego the vacuum portion of the test.

The conformal coatings used were originally de
veloped for TIROS and Lunar Orbiter and then used on
other programs. Precautions against gas entrapment
and incomplete coatings formulation are provided by
de-aerating such materials (pulling a vacuum) when
mixing, and a high temperature bake after application.
Again, these formulations have been thoroughly qual
ified for use in vacuum by virtue of extensive testing
prior to their adoption. Verification of the success
of these methods is provided by the successful per
formance in the cited programs.

DC-DC Converters. Although there are no high
voltages present, it was decided to subject the proto
type units to thermal vacuum because of the newness
of the design.
Dimensional Stability. The design precautions
required to obviate problems in this area are well
known and have been taken on the program. These
precautions include:

The housings are made of 6061-T6 aluminum
(0.040-inch thick typical and the tape recorders 0.100
inch; all components are painted with a polyamine
epoxy paint which is space-qualified ). The harness
wire, internal to the components, is made of Tefloncoated copper wire; the connectors are all gold-plated
brass. Thus, there is nothing employed which can
outgas significantly. There still remained the possi
bility that improper materials might be inadvertently
employed or the process might not be properly imple
mented. Since this possibility existed on previous
programs, an extensive review of RCA malfunctions
and test discrepancy history was made to determine
what the frequency of occurrence of this type of prob
lem had been. Not one vacuum malfunction in over
10, 000 analyzed could be attributed to improper mate
rials or an incorrectly implemented process in apply
ing these materials.

• Adequate numbers of vent holes.
• Structurally-sound design (that is, covers are
dimpled; materials have adequate safety
factors).
Assurance that these measures are more than
adequate is provided by the previous performance of
RCA hardware. Additionally, a series of tests was
conducted on Lunar Orbiter. The rapid ascent of the
launch vehicle introduced the possibility of distortions.
A series of tests was conducted which required each
component to be pressurized to two atmospheres. The
chamber was then opened, resulting in a rapid decom
pression. There was no evidence of any distortion.
Lubrication Migration
This is a significant problem, as evidenced by
several shutter problems experienced on certain pro
grams. The use of a properly qualified space grease,
Versilube (G-300), obviated the condition. However,
to avoid problems, all shutters and open switches were
exposed to vacuum as part of the acceptance test
procedure.

Sublimation
Every part and material was and is reviewed by
knowledgeable personnel prior to its acceptance for
use in a spacecraft program to ensure that it does not
contain material which could sublimate. For example,
and was-impregnated lacing
zinc and cadmium
tape are not permitted.

Cold Welding
This is a recognized phenomenon in vacuum. The
safest course is to pressurize and to expose all such
components to vacuum testing.

The effectiveness of these controls has been veri
fied by reviewing the failure history. Again no failures
were attributed to sublimation.
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All of these failures could have been anticipated
in light of the criteria cited previously.

The following paragraphs summarize the RCA
failure history on several recent spacecraft programs.
The conclusions are that components which will be
vacuum-sensitive can be successfully anticipated.

Ancenna Aspect Subsystem of the Radio Astronomy
Explorer Satellite. There were a total of 54 failures
at all levels of test. Of these, four occurred in vac
uum, of which two required vacuum to manifest them
selves.

Relay I. On the Relay I program, there were a
total of 141 malfunctions at the component, subsystem
and spacecraft levels. Of these, 79 (56 percent) were
associated with the wideband systems (receiver,beacon
and transmitter); 25 (17. 8 percent) occurred in
thermal vacuum, and 4 of these (3 percent of the total
number of malfunctions) required vacuum to evidence
themselves. All of these were in the TWT and associ
ated power supply. This could have been anticipated
because of high voltages (EH - 1200 V, E CO]J - 600V)
and high RF power (10 watts at 1600 MHz).

• A failure of the dc-dc converter, which was
required to produce 400 volts from a 24 volt
bus in vacuum. The problem was anticipated,
tests conducted and a fix, better venting, was
implemented.
• A failure of a shutter blade in vacuum. In this
case, the addition of Versilube G-300 eliminated
the condition. Again, the problem could have
been anticipated on the basis of the ground rules
cited.

Relay II. A total of 78 malfunctions were reported
at all levels of testing, 60 in component level and 18
on the spacecraft level. Exactly 9 (11.5 percent)
occurred in vacuum; of these, two required vacuum to
occur. Not unexpectedly, these involved the TWT and
associated high voltage supply. *

Classified Program, Phase A. On this program,
there were a total of 114 malfunctions and discrepan
cies reported. Of these, 18 occurred in vacuum and
18 in thermal tests. One required vacuum to manifest
itself; this was the magnetic stepper switch where the
lubrication was found to have disappeared, and the use
of Versilube G-300 corrected the problem. The trans
mitters were chronic problems, passing the supplier's
vacuum but failing in the spacecraft vacuum. They
subsequently failed in thermal testing at the supplier
after extensive temperature cycling.

It is also interesting to note that the percentage of
thermal vacuum failures is higher at the spacecraft
level than at the component level. This would seem to
indicate that the spacecraft test, because of the addi
tional handling, longer test times, and more careful
data review, is more effective in detecting failures.
Lunar Orbiter. There were a total of 1130 test
discrepancies at all levels of test; that is, board,
component, subassembly and spacecraft. These break
down into:
196
931
__3
1130

Classified Program, Phase B. Asa whole, there
were a total of 117 test discrepancies at the component
level on this program. This broke down into 32 in
thermal vacuum and 23 in thermal tests. Considering
the longer exposure time in vacuum, it would appear
that the thermal test is equally good at detecting prob
lems at the article level. None of the vacuum failures
would have required the vacuum test to manifest
themselves.

board level malfunctions
component and subassembly
spacecraft
total malfunctions

Of these, 260 (or 23 percent) occurred in thermal
vacuum. Four required vacuum to evidence the failure.
These included:

Conclusions

• A breakdown of the TWTA (12 watts at S-band)
bandpass power monitor filter at critical
pressure.

The following conclusions were made as a result
of this study:
• RCA is convinced, based on its experience,
that thermal test is equally as efficient as
thermal vacuum in detecting incipient defects
on certain nonvacuum- sensitive components.

• A breakdown of Teflon-insulated wire in the
TWT power supply. The supply was required
to put out a helix voltage (En ) of 1200 volts
and a collector voltage of 600 volts. The fix
was to put in silicone rubber wire.

• The thermal cycle is more effective than
temperature-vacuum storage tests in vacuum,

• A breakdown of a capacitor in the TWT power
supply in spacecraft test. The failure was
attributed to an accidental crease of an alumin
um sheet in the capacitor stack causing a volt
age stress. The unit had passed FAT in vac
uum at the power supply and TWTA level.

• Certain articles are vacuum-sensitive. These
can be identified in advance in terms of their
performance, parameters, construction, func
tion or parts.

• Thermal vacuum, as performed on previous
programs, has not been particularly protective
in spacecraft tests.

• A breakdown of flex wiring in the TWTA in
vacuum. Again this was corrected by using
silicone-insulated wire.
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